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ABSTRACT 
 
How does location of a firm’s headquarter effect its performance? This paper answers this 
question by using the data from India. This paper shows that portfolio of firms headquartered in 
Mumbai, the main financial center of the country, outperform portfolio of firms headquartered in 
other cities. Our results show that average returns, Sharp ratios, Farinelli and Tibiletti ratio, and 
CAPM alphas for portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in Mumbai are higher than their 
counterpart portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in other cities. We argue that firms 
headquartered in the financial center have better information environment than other firms. One 
of the channels via which improvement in information environment takes place is the clustering of 
firms in the financial center. We believe that, for any given level of resources, it is relatively cost 
effective for stock market participants to expend their resources on clustered firms to obtain value 
relevant information than on dispersed firms, thereby improving information environment of firms 
headquartered in the financial centers relative to other firms. Our arguments claim that better 
information environment of firms headquartered in the financial centers helps in maintaining 
investors’ confidence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
hy do certain firms outperform other firms? Does the extent of agency problems responsible for the 
performance of firms? Given that agency problems are important determinants of firm performance, 
answers to the above questions have formed the basis for plentiful of prior literature (Mitton, 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2000). Most of this literature revolves around understanding how firm-specific and country-specific 
proxies for agency problems, i.e. corporate governance mechanisms, effect firm performance. Gompers et al. (2003) 
document superior stock price performance of firms with lower agency problems relative to firms with higher 
agency problems. Consistent with Gompers et al. (2003), Johnson et al. (2000) argue that firms with high agency 
problems perform poorly because they are more likely to be expropriated by managers and insiders. This strand of 
literature argues that agency problems increase the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, thereby 
providing more opportunities to insiders to expropriate the resources. Higher expropriation, eventually, leads to 
lower performance. 
 
An important factor pertaining to information environment that has been overlooked in the prior literature 
is how a location of firm’s headquarter within a country affects its performance. This paper is an attempt to fill this 
gap by documenting the relationship between the two. This paper argues that firms headquartered in the financial 
center of a country have better information environment than firms headquartered elsewhere.
1
 One of the channels 
via which improvement in information environment takes place is the clustering of firms in the financial center. 
                                                          
1 Financial centers may be defined as “meeting places provided for a large number of players who contribute to the smooth 
operation of financial markets within ecosystems, giving rise to significant synergies” (Capelle-Blancard and Tadjeddine, 2009). 
W 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that significant number of emerging market firms are clustered in and around the main 
financial center of a country.
2
 Farooq and El Ouadrhiri (2013), for instance, report that around 30% of Indian firms 
are headquartered in Mumbai, the biggest financial center of India. We argue that clustering of firms in the financial 
center makes it easier for stock market participants, i.e. financial analysts and investors, to obtain information about 
these firms relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Farooq and Kamri (2011) suggest that, for any given level of 
resources, it is relatively cost effective for stock market participants to expend their resources on clustered firms to 
obtain value relevant information than on dispersed firms. Therefore, it is more cost efficient for stock market 
participants to visit operations and talk to employees/managers of large number of clustered firms to obtain 
information relative to dispersed firms. Frequent visit also, eventually, translate into development of personal 
relationships with management of these firms, thereby improving access to private information. Greater density of 
firms in the financial center, therefore, allows for higher marginal utility of resources used to obtain information. 
 
Furthermore, we believe that financial centers possess certain other characteristics as well that can make 
information environment of firms headquartered in the financial center better than information environment of firms 
headquartered in other cities. Most important of these characteristics is the presence of stock exchanges and other 
ancillary services. Capelle-Blancard and Tadjeddine (2009) argue that floor of stock exchange is the node around 
which all financial activities of the country are organized.
3
 They note that all players in finance – banks, insurance 
companies, brokerage houses, and other financial intermediaries – are situated around this node.4 We believe that 
localization of financial activity in the financial centers can improve information environment of firms 
headquartered in the financial centers for a number of reasons. For instance, firms with headquarters in the financial 
centers have more visibility than other firms. More visibility results in making stock market participants more 
familiar with the working of a firm and thus increasing their competencies in interpreting relevant firm-specific 
information. In addition, by locating themselves in the financial centers, firms can develop long-term relationships 
with financial intermediaries, which eventually lead to more information being disseminated via intermediaries 
(Jarvis, 2010).
5
 Our arguments are similar in spirit with prior literature that suggests a strong link between distance 
and information flow (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Malloy, 2005). This strand of literature maintains that distance 
is inversely related to the cost of information acquisition. Therefore, more information is revealed and disseminated 
for firms located near stock market participants. Malloy (2005), for example, document that analysts tend to be more 
accurate regarding firms located near them. All of these arguments lead us to believe that firms headquartered in the 
financial center have better information environment than firms headquartered elsewhere. 
 
Consistent with above arguments, this paper documents significantly better performance for portfolios 
comprising of firms headquartered in Mumbai, the main financial center, relative to portfolios comprising of firms 
headquartered in other cities. Our results are robust to different estimation procedures. For instance, our results show 
that average returns, Sharp ratios, Farinelli and Tibiletti ratio, and CAPM alphas for portfolios comprising of firms 
headquartered in Mumbai are higher than their counterpart portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in other 
cities. Our results indicate that better information environment for firms headquartered in Mumbai makes 
expropriation a difficult task. Consequently, investors tend to value these firms more than other firms, thereby 
improving their performance. 
 
 
                                                          
2 It is important to mention here that we are not interested in why firms cluster in the financial centers. We are more interested in 
understanding the impact of “already established clustering” on information environment. Since information environment affects 
agency problems, it should also affect firm performance. 
3 Tschoegl (2000) considers financial center as a central place where financial capital and currency can be collected, switched, 
disbursed, and exchanged. 
4 Clustering of financial activities in a certain geographic location is also true for developed markets. For example, the Square 
Mile centralizes all the financial establishments in London and the few streets around Wall Street is a home to most of financial 
activities in New York. 
5 We understand that development of information and communication technologies may lessen the incentives for locating oneself 
in the financial center. Rapid and secure data transfer (for the flow of orders as well as information) no longer requires financial 
activities to be concentrated in the financial center. However, we believe that even in economies with the most developed 
information and communication infrastructure, for example the U.S., stock market participants have shown their preference 
towards geographically proximate firms (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Malloy, 2005). 
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The result of this paper is important in a way that is identifies an important determinant of firm 
performance, i.e. location of firm’s headquarter. This factor has not been explored in previous literature. We argue 
that location can proxy for those aspects of governance and information environment that cannot be captured via 
traditional proxies such as extent of analyst following, ownership concentration, choice of firm’s auditors, and 
dividend payout ratios. We believe that location can help quantify the “genuine unknowns” encountered by stock 
market participants while making investment decision. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides descriptive statistics for the data. 
Section 3, briefly, describes the methodology used to access our hypothesis. Section 4 provides an analysis of our 
results, while Section 5 documents the conclusion. 
 
2. DATA 
 
2.1 Choice of Firms 
 
This paper documents the performance of a portfolio of firms headquartered in Mumbai, the biggest 
financial center of India, and portfolio of firms headquartered in other cities. The data for the location of firm’s 
headquarters is obtained from the Worldscope. One of the reasons behind classifying firms in these two portfolios is 
our understanding that Mumbai, being the main financial center, has better information environment than other cities 
of the country. Differences in information environment between the two portfolios should result in differences in 
performance. For the purpose of this paper, we only include the 50 largest firms in each portfolio. The reason for 
including the 50 largest firms is based on our understanding that most of the smaller firms are illiquid and are not 
traded every day. Illiquidity may result in a bias in our sample. 
 
2.2 Construction of Portfolios 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we identify the 50 largest firms with headquarters in Mumbai and the 50 
largest firms with headquarters in other cities at the start of each year. For both groups, we construct daily equally-
weighted and value-weighted portfolios as follows during the period between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 
2011. The data for daily prices is obtained from the Datastream. 
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Figure 1 shows that evolution of both portfolios during our sample period.
6
 The figure shows that portfolio 
of firms headquartered in financial centers performed better during our sample period. For equally-weighted as well 
as value-weighted portfolios, Figure 2 shows that investing in portfolio of firms headquartered in financial centers 
generate more value than investing in portfolio of firms headquartered in non-financial centers at the end of our 
sample period. 
 
 
                                                          
6 All portfolios are assigned an initial value of 100. 
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Figure 1:  Evolution of Portfolios 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics for portfolios used in this study. The results suggest that value-
weighted as well as equally-weighted portfolios of firms headquartered in Mumbai outperform portfolios of firms 
headquartered in other cities. Table 1 reports higher average returns for value-weighted and equally-weighted 
portfolios of firms headquartered in Mumbai than average returns of their counterpart portfolios. Table 1 also shows 
that returns of value-weighted portfolio of firms headquartered in Mumbai are more positively skewed and returns 
of equally-weighted portfolio of firms headquartered in Mumbai are less negatively skewed than their counterpart 
portfolios. It also indicates superior performance of portfolios of firms headquartered in Mumbai relative to 
portfolios of firms headquartered in other cities. 
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Table 1:  Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 Value-Weighted Portfolio Equally-Weighted Portfolio 
 Financial Center Non-Financial Center Financial Center Non-Financial Center 
Mean 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 
Standard Deviation 0.0175 0.0151 0.0167 0.0157 
Skewness 0.3537 0.2645 -0.0546 -0.1781 
Kurtosis 13.2078 13.0963 10.4248 11.3601 
 
3.2 Sharp Ratio 
 
Another measure of performance is Sharpe ratio (SR). SR, as proposed by Sharp (1966), is given as 
follows: 
 
P
P
P
σ
μ
SR   (3) 
 
where, μP and σP are sample mean and sample standard deviation of portfolio returns, respectively. Higher value of 
SR indicates good performance. Table 2 confirms our previous findings of superior performance of portfolios of 
firms headquartered in Mumbai relative to portfolios of firms headquartered in other cities. Table 2 reports that SR 
of value-weighted as well as equally-weighted portfolios of firms headquartered in Mumbai are greater than SR of 
their counterpart portfolios. 
 
Table 2:  Sharp Ratio 
 Value-Weighted Portfolio Equally-Weighted Portfolio 
 Financial Center Non-Financial Center Financial Center Non-Financial Center 
Mean 0.0606 0.0574 0.0455 0.0379 
 
3.3 Farinelli and Tibiletti Ratio 
 
A performance ratio should get better as the performance scenario gets better. However, if portfolio return 
distributions are skewed, which is the case in general, a favorable shift in probability may result in a lower Sharpe 
ratio. The main drawback of SR is that positive and negative deviations from the benchmark are given the same 
weights. To capture the asymmetry in the distribution of the returns, Farinelli and Tibiletti (2008) propose one sided 
measures of performance. It is known as Farinelli and Tibiletti ratio (FT). As stated by Farinelli and Tibiletti (2008), 
their ratio captures two types of asymmetry: (1) Preferred volatility when returns are above the benchmark and 
dislike volatility when returns are below the benchmark, and (2) Asymmetric preference for betting on the outcome 
with enormous potential and aversion to high losses. The FT ratio is given by: 
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where, b is a benchmark threshold, p and q are positive constants, and jt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if rt > b and 0 otherwise. The FT ratio can be viewed as general risk-reward indices suitable to compare skewed 
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returns with respect to a benchmark. For some values of p and q, the FT ratio nests some known indices: for 
example, for p = q = 1; we have the Omega index of Cascon et al. (2002) and for p = 1 and q = 2 we get the Upside 
Potential index suggested by Sortino et al. (1999). 
 
For a given benchmark b, the investor would prefer the portfolio with the highest FT ratio. Table 3 presents 
results regarding performance of each portfolio using FT ratio. It is important to mention here that three different 
arbitrary values of b are used in Table 3. These values are: 0% annual return (0% daily return), 5% annual return 
(0.0002% daily return), and 20% annual return (0.0007% daily return). Our results in Table 3 show that value-
weighted as well as equally-weighted portfolios of firms headquartered in Mumbai outperform counterpart 
portfolios of firms headquartered in the other cities for all specifications. 
 
Table 3:  Farinelli and Tibiletti Ratio 
 Value-Weighted Portfolio Equally-Weighted Portfolio 
 Financial Center Non-Financial Center Financial Center Non-Financial Center 
FT(p = q = 1; b = 0) 1.1967 1.1843 1.1431 1.1172 
FT (p = 1; q = 2; b = 0) 0.5415 0.5384 0.5135 0.5047 
FT(p = q = 1; b = 0.0002) 1.1965 1.1841 1.1428 1.1169 
FT (p = 1; q = 2; b = 0.0002) 0.5415 0.5384 0.5135 0.5047 
FT(p = q = 1; b = 0.0007) 1.1941 1.1800 1.1398 1.1135 
FT (p = 1; q = 2; b = 0.0007) 0.5410 0.5375 0.5128 0.5039 
 
3.4 Excess Return 
 
The CAPM alpha is computed as follows to see which of the two groups of portfolios outperform the 
market. 
 
  ttMkt,tP, εRETβαRET   (5) 
 
Table 4 documents α for the estimation of Equation (5). As was shown earlier, our results in Table 4 
confirm the superiority of portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in Mumbai. For all cases, our results show 
that α for portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in Mumbai is greater than α for portfolios comprising of 
firms headquartered in other cities. 
 
Table 4:  Excess Returns 
 Value-Weighted Portfolio Equally-Weighted Portfolio 
 Financial Center Non-Financial Center Financial Center Non-Financial Center 
Daily 0.000544*** 0.000577*** 0.000226** 0.000206* 
Weekly 0.000434*** 0.000341* -9.52E-05 -0.00016 
Monthly 0.015197*** 0.013235*** 0.007029** 0.005699* 
Note:  The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a 
significance level by ***. 
 
3.5 Expected Shortfall 
 
Expected shortfall (ES) is a risk measure that evaluates the market risk or credit risk of a portfolio. It is an 
alternative to value at risk that is more sensitive to the shape of the loss distribution in the tail of the distribution. 
The “expected shortfall at q% level (coverage rate)” is the expected return on the portfolio in the worst q% of the 
cases.
7
 
 
ES for both sets of portfolios – equally-weighted and value-weighted – are shown in Figure 2. The figure 
shows that ES of portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in the financial centers are always preferable than ES 
of portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in the non-financial centers. For example, Figure 2 shows that at a 
certain coverage rate returns of value weighted and equally-weighted portfolios of firms headquartered in the 
                                                          
7 Expected shortfall is also called conditional value at risk, average value at risk, and expected tail loss (ETL). 
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financial centers are always more than returns of their counterpart portfolios. It suggests that in the worst possible 
scenario, portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in the financial centers are perform superior than their 
counterpart portfolios. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Expected Shortfall 
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4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Our results in this paper have shown that portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in the financial 
centers consistently outperform their counterpart portfolios. We argue that this superior performance can be 
attributed to lower agency problems that accompany firms headquartered in the financial centers. In our case, 
Mumbai – main financial center of the country – is home to two of the biggest stock exchanges of the country, i.e. 
Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange.
8
 As a result, the city enjoys significant investor activity, 
which helps in information revelation and dissemination for firms headquartered in Bombay. Furthermore, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that headquarters of most of Indian brokerage houses are located in Mumbai.
9
 Therefore, most of 
the analysts are also located in Mumbai. In addition to this, headquarter of Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) – the capital market regulator – is also in Mumbai. We argue that geographic proximity of analysts, 
investors, and regulators with firms headquartered in Mumbai can lead to better information environment of these 
firms relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Better information environment lowers the agency problems and 
leads to better performance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines how location of a firm’s headquarter affects its performance in India. Our results show 
that portfolio of firms headquartered in Mumbai, the main financial center of the country, significantly outperform 
portfolio of firms headquartered in other cities. We show that average returns, Sharp ratios, Farinelli and Tibiletti 
ratio, and CAPM alphas for portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in Mumbai are higher than their 
counterpart portfolios comprising of firms headquartered in other cities. We argue that firms headquartered in the 
financial center have better information environment than other firms due to geographic proximity with important 
stock market participants, such as brokerage houses, analysts, creditors, and banks. Better information environment 
lowers the agency conflicts and helps in maintaining investors’ confidence. 
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